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I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2015, a polarizing scenario involving guns,
property rights, and technology unfolded at William Meredith’s Kentucky
residence. Meredith’s young daughter alerted him to a small drone flying
over the neighborhood as he, his friends, and his family were grilling in
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his backyard. 1 Annoyed, he retrieved his shotgun from his home, and
when the drone crossed his property line, he shot it out of the sky. 2 The
drone’s owner, a neighbor, called the police upon discovering his
destroyed drone, and the police arrested Meredith and charged him under
a local law for firing a gun in a populated area. At the highly publicized
trial in state court, the judge dismissed the charges with a brief statement
that Meredith was justified in shooting the drone because of the invasion
of privacy. 3
When asked on a national television news program why he shot the
drone, Meredith said that he had called the police when a drone had flown
overhead before, and the police told him they could do nothing about it. 4
Meredith said he had done some legal research and concluded (somewhat
dubiously, it turns out) that he was within his rights to shoot the drone
because of United States v. Causby, the 1946 Supreme Court aviation case
concerning landowner property rights. 5
The core dispute in the Meredith case is one that many Americans
have pondered as drones go mainstream: Where does my property line
end and drone airspace begin, and who will decide the location of the line?
As drone technology advances and regular flight paths sprout up, local
authorities and residents will demand more input over drone operations.
Air rights are bought and sold in traditional real estate and have growing
relevance for specialized infrastructure. 6 As one scholar recently asked:
“What policies are best suited to allocate airspace among its increasingly
complex array of competing uses?” 7
The Causby case, discussed later in this paper, recognized the
traditional principle that landowners own surface—but not highaltitude—airspace above their land. The 1946 decision and its antecedents
made aviation litigation more predictable—airports were compelled to
1. Nancy Grace, Previous Tensing Traffic Stop Video Emerges; Man Shoots Down Drone,
CNN TRANSCRIPTS, (aired Aug. 3, 2015, 8:00PM), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/
1508/03/ng.01.html [https://perma.cc/UUC9-2RXD].
2. Id.
3. Kieran Corcoran, Victory for Kentucky ‘Drone Slayer’ Who Took Out Aircraft Flying over
His Home with a Shotgun as Case Against Him Thrown Out of Court, DAILY MAIL, (Oct. 25, 2015,
9:10 AM), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3294792/Victory-Kentucky-Drone-Slayertook-aircraft-home-SHOTGUN.html [https://perma.cc/KP2G-CL6R].
4. Grace, supra note 1.
5. Grace, supra note 1 (“[After the police] tell me there’s nothing they can do because there’s
no laws against it, I did some research. In 1946, Causby v. U.S. Government [sic], Mr. Causby sued
the U.S. government for flying mail planes over his property and won.”). See United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
6. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in a Green Economy, 59 UCLA L. R EV. 270 (2011).
7. Id. at 274.
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purchase avigation easements from neighboring property owners.
However, as Meredith’s case illustrates, drones create new controversies
about property rights, nuisance, and government takings. State
legislatures and state real estate bars are beginning to draft legislation
protecting landowners from intrusions by low-flying drones. 8 Many states
have created drone “no-fly” zones, and Texas is currently defending its
power to prohibit drones in surface airspace surrounding state land and
sensitive locations. 9
Courts will increasingly need to apply property, nuisance, and
takings principles to low-altitude airspace as the commercial drone
industry grows. In pilot projects in the United States and around the world,
drone services companies and industry leaders—like Walmart, Google,
and UPS 10 —have made hundreds of thousands of deliveries, showing
great potential for rapid delivery for medical supplies, home parcel
delivery, and infrastructure inspections. 11 In 2016, Congress instructed the
Federal Aviation Administration to integrate small drones into the
nation’s airspace, and in January 2021 the agency announced rules to
make commercial drone services more routine, with an eye towards
8. See, e.g., Matt Reynolds, ABA House of Delegates Passes Resolution on Drones; Delegate
Calls It “a Hot Topic,” ABA J. (Feb. 17, 2020, 6:45 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/
article/resolution-111 [https://perma.cc/65G5-Q7EC] (noting that the American Bar Association will
begin “lobbying for regulations that would help prevent operators of the unmanned aircraft from
trespassing on private property”). In 2019, the American Law Institute’s drafters of the Restatement
of the Law Fourth, Property applied principles of trespass law in a new section proposed for drone
flights. See Virginia K. Trunkes, Balancing New Technology and Privacy When Using Drones in
Land Use and Construction, 10 NAT’L L. R EV. 147 (May 26, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/balancing-new-technology-and-privacy -when -using-dron es-land-us e-and -constru ction
[https://perma.cc/S3RK-VUWG].
9. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 30, Nat’l Press Photographers
Ass’n v. McCraw, 504 F. Supp. 3d 568 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 1:19-CV-946-RP).
10. See, e.g., Annette Beard & Serenah McKay, Planners Approve Walmart Drone Launch Pad
Request in Pea Ridge, NW ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:27 AM),
https://www.nwaonline.com/news/2021/jan/06/planners-approve-walmart-drone-launch-pad -request
[https://perma.cc/Q6N2-ZLXZ] (Walmart drone deliveries in Arkansas); Matt O’Brien, Girl Scout
Cookies Now Home-Delivered by Drone in Virginia as Google Affiliate Adds Service, C HI . S UN TIMES
(April 28, 2021, 11:16 AM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/business/2021/4/28/22407843/girl-scoutcookies-drones-deliveries-thin-mints-wing-alphabet-google-virginia-ch ristiansburg
[https://perma.cc/YM9R-KPRP] (Google’s subsidiary drone company making deliveries in Virginia);
Miriam McNabb, UPS Drone Delivery: DroneUp Flies to Prove the Case for Coronavirus Response,
DRONELIFE (April 21, 2020), https://dronelife.com/2020/04/21/ups-drone-delivery-droneu p partners-fly-to-prove-the-case-for-coronavi rus-response/
[https://perma.cc/YGM4-2B9N] (UPS
drone deliveries in Virginia).
11. See, e.g., the Zipline drone company, which keeps a real-time update of its completed
commercial deliveries on its company website. As of this writing the company has completed nearly
209,000 commercial deliveries, mostly in Rwanda and Ghana. ZIPLINE, https://flyzipline.com/
[https://perma.cc/JG6B-G8LT] (last visited Oct. 20, 2021).
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permitting long-distance services like parcel delivery. 12 Commercial
drones are much heavier and noisier than many people’s small, hobbyist
drones. To have an extensive commercial-drone delivery industry there
will need to be drone highways—aerial corridors—crisscrossing towns,
suburbs, and cities. Constitutional law questions and property rights
precedents, however, will pose daunting legal impediments to broad
claims of federal authority over low-altitude airspace and to drone
operations above private land. 13
There is a way forward: public officials should lease corridors of
airspace above the public rights-of-way, opening up millions of miles of
new drone highways while still protecting landowner property rights.
There is legal precedent and federal and state statutes allowing rights-ofway airspace leasing. That framework requires cooperative federalism
between federal and state aviation officials. The federal government
should devolve some responsibilities for airspace design and management
to states and cities, much like it devolved regulation of
telecommunications infrastructure to local governments.
This paper first outlines the history of federal and state regulation of
low-altitude airspace and aviation. Second, this article explains the
litigation risks of federal and state officials allowing widespread lowaltitude commercial drone flights above private land. This article proposes
airspace leasing above public rights-of-way not only to avoid landowner
lawsuits but to:
a. Open up potentially millions of miles of drone routes.
b. Allow market allocation of a scarce natural resource (surface
airspace).
c. Allow government entities to monetize public right-of-way
use and gain passive income.
Finally, this paper proposes that, in the absence of clarity from Congress,
federal and state courts should establish a presumption that the regular
flying of drones below a certain altitude amounts to a trespass. This paper
suggests an altitude of 200 feet above ground level.

12. See Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People (Final Rule), 86 Fed. Reg.
4314 (Jan. 15, 2021) (codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 11, 21, 43, and 107) (requiring drones to have
identifying wireless devices so that long-distance services can be permitted).
13. See, e.g., Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n, 504 F. Supp. at 588–91 (W.D. Tex. 2020)
(dismissing with prejudice the arguments from drone operators that state-created drone no-fly zones
are subject to conflict and field preemption).
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RULES

For years, the debate about the federal and state roles in drone
airspace regulation has gone in circles. 14 Aviation, particularly airport
management and low-altitude flights, involves a mix of federal and state
prerogatives, which are sometimes at odds. For drone flights, the
Congressional Research Service noted in a 2013 report to Congress that
“[t]his right to travel in navigable airspace came into conflict with the
common law idea that each landowner owned the airspace above the
surface in perpetuity.” 15 Nearly a decade later, Congress has not brought
clarity to the federal-state divide over drone airspace issues, even as states
increasingly assert their powers over drones and the use of surface
airspace and as influential law drafters such as the Uniform Law
Commission, American Bar Association, and the American Law Institute
draft airspace trespass provisions. 16
Congress has granted the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
authority over the management of navigable airspace, 17 but that leaves
major questions unanswered: Who controls non-navigable airspace and
surface airspace that landowners own? What are the powers of states and
cities over surface airspace used by drone operators?
The federal government is formulating its legal perspective on drone
federalism. In fall 2020, a Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report to Congress explained that the U.S. Department of Transportation
(USDOT) views all outdoor airspace as navigable airspace for drones, 18 a
14. The issue of defining aerial trespass for drones at the Uniform Law Commission is entering
its fourth year after several controversies and debates over the issue. See Tort Law Relating to Drones
Committee, UNIFORM LAW C OMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/communityhome/librarydocuments?communitykey=2cb85e0d-0a32-4182-adeeee15c7e1eb20&tab=librarydocuments&LibraryFolderKey=&DefaultView=&pag e=6
[https://perma.cc/S2P8-SBFA].
15. ALISSA M. DOLAN & R ICHARD M. THOMPSON II, C ONG. R SCH. S ERV., R42940,
INTEGRATION OF DRONES INTO DOMESTIC AIRSPACE: S ELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2013),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42940.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TB6-YPWT].
16. See Trunkes, supra note 8 (“In 2019, the American Law Institute’s (ALI) drafters of the
Fourth Restatement of Property applied principles of trespass law in proposing § 1.2A—’Trespass by
Overflight.’”); Tort Law Relating to Drones Act § 301(a) (UNIF. L. C OMM’N, Proposed Draft for
Discussion, 2018).
17. See Laura K. Donohue, A Tale of Two Sovereigns: Federal and State Use and Regulation
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, in HANDBOOK OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (Kimon P.
Valavanis & George J. Vachtsevanos eds., Springer International Publishing (AG 2d ed.
forthcoming)).
18. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-330570, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT S YSTEMS:
C URRENT JURISDICTIONAL, P ROPERTY, AND P RIVACY LEGAL ISSUES R EGARDING THE C OMMERCIAL
AND R ECREATIONAL USE OF DRONES 6 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/709370.pdf
(“Although FAA has issued no regulation prescribing minimum safe flight altitudes for [unmanned
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view that, if codified, represents a massive expansion of USDOT
jurisdiction. At the time of this writing, the USDOT and U.S. Department
of Justice are drafting their legal position. 19
The FAA cannot simply nationalize low-altitude airspace and start
authorizing drone flights across backyards, farm fields, and private
woodlands around the country. Landowners, states, and cities would
object and defend their property and constitutional rights. As one federal
judge said, in dicta, in a 2016 drone case: “the FAA believes it has
regulatory sovereignty over every cubic inch of outdoor air in the United
States.” 20 “[I]t is far from clear that Congress intends—or could
constitutionally intend—to regulate all that is airborne on one’s own
property and that poses no plausible threat to or substantial effect on air
transport or interstate commerce in general.” 21
Many states have expressly asserted sovereignty to surface airspace
for decades and are beginning to regulate that airspace. As Stephen Migala
points out in a recent law journal article about drones and federalism,
several states have created no-fly zones for drones over sensitive areas
such as critical infrastructure, schools, sports venues, and prisons.22 Some
cities, likewise, are prohibiting drone flights at low altitudes. 23 The FAA
aircraft systems (UAS)], DOT officials told us ‘it is the Department’s stance that, for purposes of the
definition of the term navigable airspace, zero feet (“the blades of grass”) is the minimum altitude of
flight for UAS.’”).
19. Id. at 3 (“Importantly, a task force of attorneys in the DOT Office of the Secretary and FAA
. . . is conducting an in-depth review of the Department’s legal position regarding federal preemption
of state and local laws and other UAS jurisdiction-related issues. . . . DOT officials told us they expect
the results of the Working Group to be provided to DOT senior leadership in the coming months.”).
20. Huerta v. Haughwout, No. 3:16-cv-358, 2016 WL 3919799, at *3 (D. Conn. July 18, 2016).
21. Id. at *3.
22. DEL. C ODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1334 (West 2020) (no operations over events with more than
1,500 people, over incidents with first responders, or over critical infrastructures); F LA. S TAT. §
330.41 (2020) (no operations over critical infrastructures); LA. S TAT. ANN. § 14:63 (2020) (defining
criminal trespass to include operating a UAS over property of another); LA. S TAT. ANN. § 14:108
(2020) (no operations over a police cordon); LA. S TAT. ANN. § 14:337 (2020) (no operations over
certain facilities, including schools); NEV. R EV. S TAT. § 493.103 (2020) (no operations under 250 feet
over property when owner notifies UAS operator); NEV. R EV. S TAT. § 493.109 (2020) (no operations
over critical facilities); OKLA. S TAT. tit. 3, § 322 (2020) (no operations over critical infrastructure
facilities); OR. R EV. S TAT. § 837.380 (2020) (restrictions over property when owner notifies UAS
operator); S.D. C ODIFIED LAWS § 50-15-3 (2020) (no operations over prisons or military facilities);
TENN. C ODE ANN. § 39-14-405 (2020) (criminal trespass via UAS over private property in nonnavigable airspace); TEX. GOV’T C ODE ANN. §§ 411.062, 411.065 (West 2020) (restrictions over state
Capitol Complex); TEX. GOV’T C ODE ANN. § 423.0046 (West 2020) (restrictions over sports venues);
WIS. S TAT. § 114.045 (2020) (no operations over a correctional institution); see also Stephen J.
Migala, UAS: Understanding the Airspace of the States, 82 J. AIR L. & C OM. 3, 62–63 (2017).
23. In October 2019, Silverthorne, Colorado, passed an ordinance that generally prohibits
drones at heights less than 40 feet above rooftops. Council Agenda Memorandum from John Minor,
Chief of Police to Town of Silverthorne, Colorado Town Council Re: Ordinance 2019-19: An
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has avoided litigating the issue, but some entities in the drone industry
assert that only federal regulators have the authority to define and prohibit
where drones operate. 24 In particular, they argue that drone no-fly zones
“may only be established . . . by the federal government.” 25 In October
2020, some drone advocates petitioned the FAA to preempt these state nofly zones. 26 As explained later in this paper, it is unclear what altitude
extinguishes state and property owners’ powers.
Drone litigation is growing, including lawsuits against states and
cities for creating no-fly zones and against drone operators for aerial
trespass. 27 One illustrative case is pending in federal court in Texas. 28 In
2013, the Texas legislature prohibited drone operations that are below 400
feet above the ground and above certain types of property in the state,
including any jail, prison, or “critical infrastructure facility.”29
Photographers sued in 2019 on several grounds, including that federal
drone regulation preempts state regulation of drone operations. 30 Even the
plaintiffs seem unclear about whether states have authority to prohibit
Ordinance to Provide for the Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://silverthorne.civicweb.net/document/23430 [https://perma.cc/9S7J-WG4E].
24. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Ass’n for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International and
the Consumer Technology Ass’n at 7, Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n v. McCraw, 504 F. Supp. 3d
568 (W.D. Tex. 2020) (No. 1:19-CV-946-RP) (asserting that state laws that “directly limit the
operations of UAS in the national airspace” by creating no-fly zones above sensitive locations are
preempted by federal regulation).
25. Betsy Lillian, Drone Industry Responds to Draft Tort Law on “Aerial Trespass,”
UNMANNED AERIAL (July 25, 2018), https://unmanned-aerial.com/drone-industry-responds-to-draft tort-law-on-aerial-trespass (quote attributed to representatives in the drone industry).
26. Letter from All. for Drone Innovation et al. to FAA Adm’r Steve Dickson Re:
Implementation of Section 2209 2, (Oct. 22, 2020) (on file with the author).
27. See Donohue, supra note 17, at 20–22. A Louisiana court in early 2020 convicted a man of
criminal trespass (a misdemeanor) under state law for flying a drone with a camera above neighbor’s
property. The man appears to have violated La. Stat. Ann. § 14:63 (defining criminal trespass to
include operating a UAS over property of another). Josh Spires, Drone Pilot Vows Fight After Arrest
for Flying over His Neighbor’s Home, DRONEDJ (July 6, 2020), https://dronedj.com/2020/07/06/
drone-pilot-arrested-and-banned-for-flying-his-dron e/ [https://perma.cc/K4F8-JVPX]. Louisiana law
prohibits operating a drone over another’s property without permission. In the words of the defendant,
“You’re not getting help from the FAA. . . . You’re on your own.” Ken Heron, Jailed and Banned
from Owning a Drone (Can They Do That?!) at 10:00, YOUTUBE (July 2, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ufWqRiYRmcA&feature [https://perma.cc/69TK-GLCU].
28. See Silas Allen, Photojournalists Group Challenges Texas’ Drone Law, DALL. OBSERVER
(Sept. 27, 2019, 4:00AM), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/news-photographers-group-s ues to-have-texas-drone-law-overturned -11766014 [https://perma.cc/M6NS-56ST].
29. TEX. GOV’T C ODE ANN. §§ 423.0045–.0046 (West).
30. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 30, Nat’l Press Photographers
Ass’n v. McCraw, 504 F. Supp. 3d 568 (W.D. Tex. 2020), https://www.courthousenews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/09/news-drones.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EC5-G6FR] (“By banning drone use
within the airspace around critical infrastructure and other facilities, Texas is attempting to regulat e
aviation safety through its No-Fly Provisions.”).
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low-altitude drone flights and concede in their brief that the state “may
promulgate drone regulations consistent with its traditional police powers,
such as to protect privacy or prevent trespass or voyeurism.” 31
States are also beginning to fund and test drone management systems
in low-altitude airspace. North Dakota authorized $28 million in 2019 for
a statewide unmanned traffic management (UTM) system. 32 Ohio’s drone
task force director says they hope to have a statewide UTM system in the
next few years. 33 The federal policy for traditional aviation, which will
likely extend to drone aviation, is that local airport operators, whether
public or private, assume any liability related to trespass, nuisance, and
takings lawsuits from affected landowners. 34 Landowners, particularly
commercial landowners, 35 are likely to resist and sue over frequent drone
flights over their land. This legal uncertainty about whether drones can fly
at low altitudes over private property raises the prospect that drone
operators will face costly lawsuits and statewide injunctions.
III. LEGAL HISTORY OF AIRSPACE REGULATION
A.

Airspace as Property

Low-altitude airspace “is a complex and oft-forgotten natural
resource” 36 and a monetizable asset bearing the hallmarks of property. 37
31. Id. at 29.
32. Patrick Groves, North Dakota Plans Statewide Drone Air Traffic Control, GOVERNMENT
TECHNOLOGY (June 10, 2019), https://www.govtech.com/products/North-Dakota-Plans-StatewideDrone-Air-Traffic-Control.html [https://perma.cc/88TE-EDRP].
33. Brian Garrett-Glaser, At Ohio Air Taxi Symposium, Policy Seen as Far Behind Technology,
AVIATION TODAY (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.aviationtoday.com/2020/03/03/ohios-grand-plansurban-air-mobility/ [https://perma.cc/B2AR-X4B6].
34. The airport operator bears the cost of acquiring the necessary clearance zones to comply
with the FAA standards. The federal policy, as a New York state court summarized it, is “not to have
the Federal Government assume any liability relative to takeoff and landing rights.” Kupster Realty
Corp. v. State, 404 N.Y.S.2d 225, 231 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1978).
35. As one property scholar notes: “Air rights are frequently the most valuable rights connected
with the ownership of commercial land since the value of such property consists principally of the
owner’s right to erect buildings in the airspace.” Mark H. Allen, The Federal Income Tax
Consequences of Commercial Conveyances of Rights in Airspace, 47 J. AIR L. & C OM. 91, 91 (1981).
36. Troy A. Rule, Airspace and the Takings Clause, 90 WASH. U. L. R EV. 421, 425 (2012).
37. Demsetz presaged the competition for low-altitude airspace in a 1966 article:
In the case of lower airspace, we are dealing with the problem of whether or not the right
to use or own lower airspace should be involuntarily reassigned. The existence of serious
competing claims to the use of lower airspace should create doubt about our ability to
judge which use is most valuable and, hence, should lead us to rely to a larger extent on
voluntary negotiations between competing claimants and landowners.
Harold Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J.L. & ECON. 61, 67 (1966) (emphasis in
original).
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In Harold Demsetz’s influential property rights work in the 1960s, he
identified an economic phenomenon: technology shocks create demand
for novel assets, and property rights emerge to coordinate increased use
of the asset. 38 This Demsetz phenomenon has been documented for many
previously lightly used resources that became propertized, including the
Great Plains circa 1870, 39 Native American lands in colonial Canada, 40
and the pre-1927 radio spectrum. 41 One can trace a similar story in surface
airspace.
Airspace as property, including airspace sales and leasing, has a long
pedigree in American law. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, most
Anglo-American courts and property theorists rejected the view that
“land” projected infinitely upward. 42 Instead, courts cited the maxim ad
coelum—”Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent,
upwards as well as downwards”—frequently in trespass cases but often
denied that there could be a trespass or a property interest in airspace that
was not practically usable by the landowner. 43 As a court in Minnesota
said in a 1923 aerial trespass case, “when, as here, the air is to be
considered at an altitude of two thousand feet or more, to contend that it
is part of the realty . . . is only a legal fiction, devoid of substantial
merit.” 44

38. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. R EV. 347, 350 (1967);
see also Terry L. Anderson & P. J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American
West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163, 170–72 (1975) (showing that it became economical for cattlemen, for
instance, to fence off the Great Plains as land value increased and the cost of defining property rights
decreased from 1860 to 1900).
39. Anderson & Hill, supra note 38, at 170–72.
40. Around 1700, Native Americans near Quebec divided their hunting land because of
increased demand for animal fur. Demsetz, supra note 38, at 351–53.
41. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast
Spectrum, 33 J.L. & ECON. 133, 143–44 (1990) (“There existed a very lively market in broadcast
properties, sold with frequency rights attached, early in the development of the industry (that is, pre1927).”).
42. The famous ad coelum maxim is that “[l]and hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite
extent, upwards as well as downwards.” 2 WILLIAM B LACKSTONE, C OMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND: IN F OUR B OOKS 18 (1818). The Supreme Court in United States v. Causby somewhat
exaggerated “indefinite extent” in this maxim to mean something like “infinite extent.” United States
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260 (1946) (characterizing ad coelum as the “ancient doctrine that at
common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe”).
43. One legal scholar noted in 1910: “[I]t is curious to note that even as late as the early part of
the last [that is, 19th] century, there was considerable doubt as to whether trespass would lie, where
there was no tangible interference with the land, but only with the airspace.” Arthur K. Kuhn, The
Beginnings of an Aërial Law, 4 AM. J. INT’L L. 109, 123 (1910).
44. Johnson v. Curtiss Nw. Airplane Co., 1928 U.S. Av. R. 42, 43–44 (Arnold W. Knauth,
Henry G. Hotchkiss & Emory H. Niles, eds., 1928).
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However, courts have long treated surface airspace as real property.45
Anglo-American legal treatises from the 1840s onward note that one
could partition property horizontally 46 and that airspace—the “upper
chamber” of a parcel of real estate—could be owned separately from the
surface property. 47 In the mid-1800s, the Illinois Supreme Court “took it
for granted that there could be a horizontal severance of ownership in a
building, with the ground floor owned by one person, and the upper
portion of the building by another ‘in fee.’” 48 Perhaps the first AngloAmerican statute recognizing landowners’ exclusive rights to surface
airspace was The Telegraph Act of 1863 in England, which codified
landowners’ right to object to the construction of a telegraph line hanging
above their property. 49 American law mirrored this principle in a 1906
trespass case, Butler v. Frontier Telephone Co., dealing with a telephone
line 30 feet above private land: “The law regards the empty space as if it
were a solid, inseparable from the soil, and protects it from hostile

45. A New York court in 1906, for instance, allowed for the ejectment of a telephone line above
property but warned that “this [ad coelum] may not be taken too literally.” Butler v. Frontier Tel. Co.,
186 N.Y. 486, 491, (1906); see also Johnson v. Curtiss Nw. Airplane Co., 1928 U.S. Av. R. 42, 44
(Arnold W. Knauth, Henry G. Hotchkiss, & Emory H. Niles, eds., 1928) (“The air, so far as it has any
direct relation to the comfort and enjoyment of the land, is appurtenant to the land, and no less the
subject of protection than the land itself . . . .”).
46. JOHN B. P HEAR, A TREATISE ON R IGHTS OF WATER 2 (V. & R. Stevens and G.S. Norton
1859) (“[T]he partition [of land] may be carried on in a vertical, as well as in a horizontal
direction . . . .”).
47. See S ILAS JONES, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL S CIENCE 179 (J. S. Voorhies 1842) (noting
exceptions to ad coelum) (“[F]or instance, a man may have an inheritable corporeal property in an
upper chamber, though the lower stories and soil may belong to another. This, it is true, is as much as
saying a man may have land by owning an upper chamber, or in other words, that an upper chamber
is land!”); JOSEPH A. S HEARWOOD, A C ONCISE ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF R EAL P ROPERTY AND
AN INTRODUCTION TO C ONVEYANCING 2 (Stevens & Sons 1878) (“One man therefore may have a
house in fee and another the ground in fee; or if the house is subdivided in chambers there may be
different owners in fee to each set.”). As one treatise noted:
The English law is different [from the absolute ownership principles in Roman law],
permitting one man to own the surface, another to own a mining substratum, while still a
third owns a horizontal flat in the structure erected upon the land. Accordingly, I say, the
adoption of a zone theory would be quite in harmony with the general spirit of the English
land law as regards these horizontal hereditaments.
HAROLD D. HAZELTINE, THE LAW OF THE AIR 75 (Univ. of London Press 1911).
48. Theodore Schmidt, Public Utility Air Rights, 1 J. AIR L. & C OM. 52, 63 (1930) (citing
McConnel v. Kibbe, 29 Ill. 483 (1852); McConnel v. Kibbe, 33 Ill. 175 (1864)).
49. Telegraph Act 1863, 64 Vict. c. 112, § 22 (Eng.) (“[T]he [telegraph] Company shall not
place a Telegraph above Ground . . . or place a Telegraph above Ground across an Avenue or
Approach to a Dwelling House” unless “in each Case [the company] obtain the Consent of the”
occupier, lessee, or owner). See also JOHN F. C LERK & W. H. B. LINDSELL, LAW OF TORTS 291 (2d
ed. 1896) (“The provisions of the Telegraph Act, 1863 . . . are based upon the assumption that there
is a right of property in the air space . . . ) (citing Telegraph Act 1863, ch. 112).
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occupation accordingly.” 50 As one contemporaneous treatise noted: “It
follows from this [ad coelum principle] that land may be divided
horizontally as well as vertically, and the owner of land may divide and
sell the space above the surface . . . as well as he can divide the surface
into city lots.” 51
Building construction innovations at the turn of the century increased
the value of low-altitude airspace—the economic phenomenon Demsetz
identified—because high-rises and skyscrapers could now occupy
airspace above urban land. New York’s 1916 zoning law, imitated around
the country, was the first to limit building size by volume—height and
setback rules—which accelerated the propertization of airspace in cities. 52
Airspace sales and transfers began in earnest in the 1920s, 53 especially
after the development of the Merchandise Mart in Chicago recorded the
first “air lot.” 54 This air lot lease above the Chicago railroad terminal
derived from common law principles of land partition. 55 In 1930, the
growing airspace marketplace led a former American Bar Association
president to say: “This practice of the owner retaining the use of the
surface of his land and leasing or selling air space above is becoming
increasingly common and obtains in many of our large cities.” 56
By the 1960s, condominium laws simplified the process of
demarcating fee simple interests in land in a vertical column. 57 The
creation and sale of airspace tracts separate from the land was routine. 58

50. Butler, 186 N.Y. at 491.
51. JOHN G. HAWLEY & MALCOLM MCGREGOR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF R EAL PROPERTY
5 (Collector Pub. Co. 1900).
52. See THEODORE S TEINBERG, S LIDE MOUNTAIN: OR, THE F OLLY OF OWNING NATURE 146
(1995) (noting change after passage of the 1916 law) (“[A]irspace, a three-dimensional abstraction,
became a thing that could be owned and sold.”) (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 148 (“Transferring air was nothing new in New York. The city had permitted the
shifting of air rights from lot to lot to build higher towers at various times since the 1920s.”).
54. Schmidt, supra note 48, at 68.
55. Id. at 68, 70–71. A 1929 conveyance of air rights in Boston was done using common law
principles.
56. Id. at 54 (quoting a former American Bar Association president).
57. See Douglas C. Harris, Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver, 36
L. & S OC. INQUIRY 694, 695 (2011).
58. Note, Conveyance and Taxation of Air Rights, 65 C OLUM. L. R EV. 338, 339 (1964) (“[I]t
seems reasonably clear that an owner may effectively convey ‘tracts’ of space that are physically
unattached to the land.”). The ABA published the Model Airspace Act in 1972, which formalized
airspace propertization, but only Oklahoma appears to have adopted significant portions of the act.
See Subcommittee on Airspace Utilization and Multiple Use, Committee on New Developments in
Real Estate Practice, Final Draft of Model Airspace Act, 7 R EAL P ROP. P ROB. & TR. J. 353 (1972);
OKLA. S TAT. tit. 60, § 802.
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In the decades since, treatment of airspace and airspace lots vary under
state law, though states treat them as a form of real property. 59
B.

Early Aviation and State Sovereignty Over Airspace

Early aviation law grafted onto a tradition of treating surface airspace
as real property. State and local governments asserted their authority over
airspace soon after the Wright brothers unveiled their invention. Many
believe the world’s first aviation legislation was the municipal ordinance
passed by the Kissimmee, Florida, town council in 1908. 60 The law
claimed jurisdiction over the airspace above town up to 20 miles in the
sky. 61 Massachusetts was regulating flight and prohibiting flight over
crowded areas in 1913. 62 The law viewed low-altitude airspace as part of
the underlying land, over which state governments had sovereignty.
Harold Hazeltine, in his 1911 air law treatise, noted the following: 63
[A]ir above a land has such a close relationship to the land that it may
be looked upon as an appurtenance of the territorial state or even as a
part of the territorial state. . . . It is quite clear, I think, that states exercise
a right of sovereignty in the lowest stratum of the air-space, that stratum,
namely, occupied by buildings and other structures with the encircling
atmosphere.

Beginning in the 1920s, after drafting the Uniform State Law for
Aeronautics, states began codifying their sovereignty claims over surface
59. See, e.g., VA. C ODE ANN. § 55.1-1900 (2020) (defining “land” as “a three-dimensional
concept”); Macht v. Dep’t of Assessments, 296 A.2d 162, 167–68 (Md. 1972) (holding that for
assessment purposes, airspace is treated like a negative easement for a term of years); 68 P A. C ONS.
S TAT. § 802 (2020) (“[R]ights and interests in air space . . . shall be dealt with for all purposes and in
all respects as estates, rights and interests in real property.”); In re Bigman, 533 A.2d 778, 781 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1987) (“Although air space does not fit squarely within either of these definitions, we
conclude that it is more closely aligned with ‘buildings’ than with ‘land.’”). But see Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (holding that air rights do not constitute real
property in the context of regulatory takings).
60. See HAZELTINE, supra note 47, at 47–48 (“A little town in Florida has already passed an
ordinance relative to traffic in the air, claiming jurisdiction as high as twenty kilometres, and asserting
that it proposes to establish an aerial police!”).
61. Among other things, the ordinance required aircraft to travel at slow speed at low altitudes,
prohibited occupants from throwing debris from an aircraft in flight, and required an annual license
fee. John Robert Tamm, The Status of States’ Rights in the Airspace of the United States: The
Sovereign Powers of and the Powers Exercised by the Several States at Airports and in the Airspace
Superjacent to Their Territory 251, app. 1 (Mar. 1978) (Ph.D dissertation, McGill University)
(including section 1 of Kissimmee’s Aircraft Ordinance, adopted 1908).
62. See Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N.E. 385, 388 (Mass. 1930).
63. HAZELTINE, supra note 47, at 15, 46–47 (distinguishing air from the sea). Though Hazeltine
is speaking of nations when referring to “states,” in the United States land and territory are generall y
held and regulated by subnational states upon joining the union.
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airspace against the federal government. 64 At least 19 states have these
laws today. 65 Until the 1950s, airport and airspace regulation had a local
character that federal law tolerated and even encouraged. 66
There was notable resistance from aviators to airspace ownership and
state sovereignty. Stuart Banner notes in his history of airspace regulation
that the aviation industry sought to eliminate the concept of owning
airspace in the early 20th century. 67 In the debates over the drafting of
influential Uniform State Law for Aeronautics in 1922 and the
Restatement of Torts in 1934, aviators lost both battles to real estate and
property advocates. 68 The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics allowed
flights if they did not interfere with the “then existing use” of a property. 69
In tort law, flight over property at low altitude was a privilege subject to
landowners’ right of exclusion. 70
News stories frequently cover the sale and lease of private airspace
in dense cities; however, the public airspace market receives less

64. Section 2 of the 1922 Uniform State Law for Aeronautics provided: “Sovereignty in the
space above the lands and waters of this State is declared to rest in the State, except where granted to
and assumed by the United States pursuant to a constitutional grant from the people of this State.”
UNIF. S TATE L. FOR AERONAUTICS § 2 (NAT’L C ONF. OF C OMM’R ON UNIF. S TATE L. 1922).
65. ARIZ. R EV. S TAT. ANN. § 28-8206 (West 2020); C AL. P UB. UTIL. C ODE § 21401 (Deering
2020); C OLO. R EV. S TAT. § 41-1-106 (2020); DEL. C ODE Ann. tit. 2, § 302 (2020); HAW . R EV. S TAT.
§ 263-2 (2020); IDAHO C ODE § 21-202 (2020); IND. C ODE § 8-21-4-2 (2020); ME. R EV. S TAT. tit.1, §
6 (West 2020); MD. C ODE ANN., TRANSP. § 5-104 (West 2020); MINN. S TAT. § 360.012 (2020);
MONT. C ODE ANN. § 67-1-202 (2019); NEV. R EV. S TAT. § 493.030 (2019); N.C. GEN. S TAT. § 63-11
(2019); N.D. C ENT. C ODE § 2-03-02 (2019); N.J. S TAT. ANN. § 6:2-4 (2020); TENN. C ODE ANN. §
42-1-102 (2020); UTAH C ODE ANN. § 72-10-123 (West 2020); WIS. S TAT. § 114.02 (2020); WYO.
S TAT. ANN. § 10-4-301 (2020). South Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont repealed their airspace
sovereignty statutes in 2012, 2014, and 1997, respectively. See S.C. C ODE ANN. § 55-3-30 (repealed
2012); S.D. C ODIFIED LAWS § 50-13-2 (repealed 2014); VT. S TAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 401 (repealed 1997).
66. Janet R. Daley Bednarek, in her history of early American airports, notes that by 1926, “it
had been fairly firmly, but not exclusively established, that local governments (primarily cities, but
sometimes counties or city-county combinations), with or without federal aid, would take the lead in
building the nation’s airports.” JANET R. DALEY B EDNAREK, AMERICA’S AIRPORTS: AIRFIELD
DEVELOPMENT, 1918–1947 at 15 (2001). The California Supreme Court in 1935 refused to consider
applying federal aviation laws in the case because “under the federal Constitution and the California
Aircraft Act enacted in 1929 the state of California was vested with exclusive power to prescribe air
traffic rules to govern the operation of aircraft flying in purely intrastate flights.” Parker v. James
Granger, Inc., 52 P.2d 226, 230 (Cal. 1935).
67. See, e.g., S TUART B ANNER, WHO OWNS THE S KY?: THE S TRUGGLE TO CONTROL AIRSPACE
FROM THE WRIGHT B ROTHERS ON 185–97 (2008).
68. Id.
69. UNIF. S TATE. L. FOR AERONAUTICS § 4 (NAT’L C ONF. OF C OMM’R ON UNIF. S TATE
L.1922).
70. B ANNER, supra note 67, at 197 (“According to the Restatement of Torts, landowners owned
their airspace, subject only to a privilege of reasonable flights at reasonable heights.”).
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attention. 71 With this sovereignty and property in hand, state departments
of transportation (DOTs) began leasing public airspace—typically above
the right-of-way—in earnest in the 1970s and 1980s as a revenue source. 72
The legal mechanisms for state DOT leasing of airspace are discussed
later in this paper because it is a potentially groundbreaking way to
greenlight and safely manage widespread commercial drone services. One
must keep these earlier sovereignty and property understandings in mind
to approach and interpret contemporary federal aviation legislation.
C.

Federal Sovereignty Over Airspace Is Not Nationalization of
Airspace

Congress passed the 1926 Air Commerce Act to bring some order to
the regulation of interstate and foreign air services. Included in that Act
was a declaration of “complete sovereignty of the airspace over the lands
and waters of the United States.” 73 Read in isolation, this provision, to the
uninitiated, could be misinterpreted as the nationalization of airspace
against state and local powers.
One can readily dismiss that interpretation. The law’s drafters, 74 the
Senate legislative counsel, 75 and the Supreme Court nearly 20 years later76
71. See, e.g., Charles V. Bagli, With $240 Million Deal, Floodgates Open for Air Rights in
Midtown East, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/02/nyregion/jpmorgan-chase-midtown-east-air-rights.html [https://perma.cc/YE9E-3KG9].
72. S TEPHEN S. R OOP & S ONDIP MATHUR, TEXAS DEP’T OF TRANSP., R ESEARCH R EPORT
1329-1F, LEASING OF TXDOT’S R IGHTS OF WAY (1993).
73. Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568, § 6 (1926). In 1938, this
declaration was amended somewhat, though it was still interpreted to mean sovereignty against
foreign nations. See Donohue, supra note 17, at 35–36.
74. Senator Hiram Bingham, one of the drafters of the law, confirmed that the act made “no
interference with municipal or State regulation.” 67 C ONG. R EC. 9355 (1926) (statement of Sen.
Bingham) (“None whatever.”).
75. In his influential legal brief to the U.S. Senate about the 1926 Air Commerce Act, Senate
legislative counsel Frederic P. Lee noted that the sovereignty provisions left surface air rights
unaffected:
It is true that the principle of exclusive Federal sovereignty in the air domain above the
surface air space, rests the validity of such diverse State regulations (so far as they apply
to the upper strata of air space) only upon the consent of the Federal Government rather
than upon a State power which may be exercised irrespective of the action of the Federal
Government.
Frederic P. Lee, The Air Domain of the United States, Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate (1926)
(emphasis added), reprinted by General Printing Office, Civil Aeronautics, Legislative History of the
Air Commerce Act of 1926, 104 (1928).
76. The Court in Braniff Airways rejected the claim that the sovereignty provision nationalized
airspace against the states:
The provision pertinent to sovereignty over the navigable air space in the Air Commerce
Act of 1926 was an assertion of exclusive national sovereignty. The convention between
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repudiated the idea that it was a declaration against the states. Migala
notes in his examination of the major federal aviation laws in 1926, 1938,
and 1958 that it is “exceedingly clear that Congress used this section to
declare sovereignty only internationally; it did not intend to trample on
the sovereignty of states’ airspace rights.” 77 According to
contemporaneous congressional records, “The [sovereignty] section in no
wise affects the apportionment of sovereignty as between the several
States, but only as between the United States and the rest of the world.”78
The 1926 act went so far as to permit, in section 4, “airspace
reservations” by the states. 79 The crucial implication of this statute, one
legal observer noted, is that “sovereignty [over surface airspace] was
acquired by a State before it was admitted into the Union and was retained
afterward, or sovereignty was acquired subsequent to statehood.” 80 In
1958, Congress updated the aviation statutes with the Federal Aviation
Act. Airspace was becoming scarcer, and collisions more likely, as civil
and military operators competed for use. 81 Section 4 of the 1926 Act,
which recognized the power of states to make airspace reservations, was
the United States and other nations respecting international civil aviation . . . accords. The
Act, however, did not expressly exclude the sovereign powers of the states. . . . These
Federal Acts regulating air commerce are bottomed on the commerce power of Congress,
not on national ownership of the navigable air space, as distinguished from sovereignty.
Braniff Airways v. Neb. St. Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 595–96 (1954).
77. Migala, supra note 22, at 15.
78. S TAFF OF H. C OMM. ON INTERSTATE AND F OREIGN C OMMERCE, 69TH C ONG., C IVIL AIR
NAVIGATION 8 (Comm. Print 1926) (to accompany S. 41, 69th Cong.). For similar statement, see H.R.
R EP. NO. 68-1262, at 19 (1925). Colonel W. Jefferson Davis, for instance, represented the War
Department at the Congress on International Aviation Legislature, and he writes in his 1930 casebook,
Aeronautical Law: “The question of sovereignty as between the Federal government and the states is
not solved by the [1926] Federal Air Commerce Act. The declaration of sovereignty [in the 1926 Act]
is only with regard to international relations.” W. JEFFERSON DAVIS, AERONAUTICAL LAW 128
(1930).
79. The original House bill for what became the 1926 Air Commerce Act included a provision
authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to regulate aircraft and pilots in intrastate commerce. 67
C ONG. R EC. 9355 (1926) (statement of Sen. Bingham). In the compromise bill that passed, that
authority over intrastate aircraft and pilots was stripped out and replaced by a section that expressly
protected state powers over low-altitude airspace. Id. The law that eventually passed permitted states,
in section 4, to make “airspace reservations,” in order that they may preclude low-altitude flights over
cities and sports venues. Air Commerce Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 570 (repealed in 1958); see 67 C ONG.
R EC. 9355 (1926) (statement of Sen. Bingham). In debating the airspace reservations issue, Sen.
Bingham conceded that hypothetically, states had the power under the bill to exclude interstate
commerce from the airspace reservations. 67 C ONG. R EC. 9355 (1926) (statement of Sen. Bingham).
80. Armine C. Ernst, Note, Possible Impact of the Tidelands Decisions on Airspace
Sovereignty, 7 S W . L.J. 280, 284 (1953) (emphasis added).
81. Federal Aviation Agency Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the S. Comm.
on Interstate & Foreign Com., 85th Cong. 151 (1958) (statement of E. R. Quesada, Chairman,
Airways Modernization Board).
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dropped. As Migala notes, throughout the hearings and reports preceding
the 1958 Federal Aviation Act, there was no discussion of state power to
make airspace reservations. 82
Nevertheless, one cannot interpret this omission of section 4 as the
nationalization of all airspace against state powers. First, in 1958,
Congress was surely familiar with the express holding of the 1946 Causby
case that federally approved air routes must yield to property rights at low
altitudes. Further, adding a “savings clause” to the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958 that preserved the effect of state laws, including “the remedies
now existing at common law or by statute,” did not extinguish state
powers over surface airspace. 83 Now this paper turns to the legal treatment
of surface airspace and the remedies at common law and state law.
D.

Causby and Landowners’ Airspace as Property

During World War II, the government condemned and acquired a
wedge of airspace from a few property owners adjacent to a military
airport in Louisiana so that airplanes were guaranteed an unobstructed
glide path to the runway. 84 For reasons lost to history, the U.S.
government made no such compensation to the Causbys, farmers in North
Carolina, before converting a small local airport bordering the Causbys’
chicken farm into a military airport. The Causbys challenged Army flights
82. Migala notes the following: Throughout the hearings for the 1958 Act, and in all of the
accompanying reports and testimony that make up the comprehensive legislative history, at no time
was there any discussion about states’ rights to enact airspace reservations under § 4. Supra note 22,
at 59.
83. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1506 ( West 1988), amended by 49 U.S.C. § 40120(c) (1994). In 1994,
Congress engaged in a recodification of the Federal Aviation Act, and the savings clause now reads:
a “remedy under this part is in addition to any other remedies provided by law.” Courts, scholars, and
contemporaneous congressional records hold that this recodification was not intended to effect a
substantive change from the predecessor statutes. See, e.g., Vreeland v. Ferrer, 71 So. 3d 70, 77 n.3
(Fla. 2011) (citing 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 818) (emphasis in original) (“Congress expressly stated that a
recodification of the federal aviation statutes that occurred in 1994, which included renumberin g
section 1506 as section 40120(c), was not intended to substantively change those statutes.”); See also
Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 473 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The United
States does not ‘own’ the airspace above its territorial boundaries, although it undoubtedly has
considerable authority to regulate the use of that airspace.”). As the Colorado Supreme Court
recognized in a 1994 case about airspace management, the Federal Aviation Act contains no explicit
preemption of local regulation of air traffic and airspace management. This was a banner ad case. The
court did find, however, that the local regulations were preempted because towing objects was within
the exclusive domain of the federal government. The court also found that the ordinance was
preempted because it “stands as an obstacle” to the purposes and objectives of Congress. Banner
Advert. v. City of Boulder, 868 P.2d 1077, 1084 (Colo. 1994).
84. The easement to the airspace began at 25 feet above the ground and continued for 15 years,
or until the war concluded. United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land in Calcasieu Parish, 55 F. Supp.
461, 461 (W.D. La. 1944).
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over their property as an unconstitutional taking, a famous property rights
case decided by the Supreme Court in 1946.
The low-altitude flights of bomber planes terrified the Causbys—one
errant Army aircraft missed a landing and killed their neighbors, a mother,
and three children. 85 The constant airplane noise, which killed nearly 150
of the Causbys’ chickens, had destroyed their livelihood. 86 The Supreme
Court agreed with the Causbys that low-altitude flights could amount to a
taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Causby case also formalized
longstanding trends in the law discussed earlier, particularly the idea that
there are two layers of airspace: a high-altitude layer that the federal
government largely controls and a low-altitude layer largely under the
control of landowners and U.S. state powers.
In Causby, the federal government argued (a) that flights at low
altitude, if within “navigable airspace,” cannot amount to a taking 87 and
(b) that landowners do not own surface airspace—the “superadjacent
airspace”—except that occupied by buildings. 88 The Supreme Court
rejected both arguments.
In rejecting the government’s first argument, the Court held that “the
flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much
an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon
it.” 89 When flights invade the airspace that the landowner can “use in
connection with the land,” the Court said a taking could occur. 90
In rejecting the second argument, the Court held that landowners do
own surface airspace above their land: “The landowner owns at least as
much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection
with the land.” 91 Finally, the Court acknowledged and cited favorably
North Carolina’s claim to sovereignty to surface airspace in its takings

85. B ANNER, supra note 67, at 229.
86. Id. at 229.
87. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260 (1946) (“It is, therefore, argued [by the federal
government] that since these flights were within the minimum safe altitudes of flight which had been
prescribed, they were an exercise of the declared right of travel through the airspace. The United
States concludes that when flights are made within the navigable airspace without any physical
invasion of the property of the landowners, there has been no taking of property.”). B ANNER, supra
note 67, 250 (“None of [the Justices] cared that federal law had defined as navigable airspace the area
in which the planes flew over the Causbys’ land.”).
88. Causby, 328 U.S. at 260 (“[The United States] also argues that the landowner does not own
superadjacent airspace which he has not subjected to possession by the erection of structures or other
occupancy.”).
89. Id. at 264.
90. Id. at 264.
91. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
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analysis. 92 The Supreme Court reiterated in Causby that “while the
meaning of ‘property’ as used in the Fifth Amendment was a federal
question, ‘it will normally obtain its content by reference to local law.’”93
E.

Post-Causby Effects and the Two Zones of Airspace

In the wake of the Causby decision, a commentator noted that the
Court had formalized the traditional view (described by Frederic Lee in
drafting the 1926 Act, for instance 94 ) to divide airspace into two zones:
In the lower zone next to the earth’s surface, private property in the
airspace is permitted and we must assume that in that zone normal
relationships exist between State and Federal sovereignty as elsewhere
in State territory. But in the upper zone . . . the rights of the Federal
Government seem to have been considered so paramount that Congress
was able to place the navigable airspace, as stated in the Court’s opinion,
“within the public domain.” 95

The Causby case brought predictability to potential litigants in airport
cases. 96 After Causby, Congress amended “navigable airspace” to mean
takeoff and landing glide paths. Aviation officials believed this
amendment negated takings lawsuits for planes staying in their authorized
92. Id. at 266 (“Sovereignty in the airspace rests in the State ‘except where granted to and
assumed by the United States.’ Gen.Stats.1943, § 63-11.”).
93. Id. at 266 (quoting United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943)); see
also Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida. Dep’t. of Env’t Prot., 550 U.S. 702, 732 (2010)
(“The Takings Clause only protects property rights as they are established under state law, not as they
might have been established or ought to have been established.”). Further: “Generally speaking, state
law defines property interests, including property rights in navigable waters and the lands underneath
them.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 550 U.S. at 707 (internal citation omitted; emphasis
added); Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
94. Lee noted:
Two types of air domain are required to be distinguished, the higher strata of air space and
the surface air space. . . . Such surface air space has always been regarded as appurtenant
to the contiguous lands and waters and a part of the domain of the nation holding such
lands and waters. Such surface air space is acquired as a part of the domain of a nation by
the same method and at the same time as the subjacent land and waters are acquired. The
acquisition, as a part of a nation’s domain, of the higher strata of air space is dependent
however, on other considerations [namely, international law].
Lee, supra note 75, at 108.
95. John C. Cooper, State Sovereignty vs. Federal Sovereignty of Navigable Airspace, 15 J. AIR
L. & C OM. 27, 27 (1948); see also Madeline C. Dinu, State Sovereignty in the Navigable Airspace,
17 J. AIR L. & C OM. 43, 51 (1950) (“So far as the private property owner is concerned, the
superadjacent non-navigable airspace below safe altitudes of flight . . . has the quality of property,
and as an incident to his ownership of the land, the landowner has a claim to such non-navigable
airspace. Invasions of it are like trespass on the surface, and the rights of the private property–owner
are paramount in such non-navigable airspace.”).
96. B ANNER, supra note 67, at 260.
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glide paths, but the Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Allegheny Cty. that
even planes in navigable airspace are invading property at low altitudes. 97
As the Supreme Court said in Griggs, Causby stands for the proposition
that government must compensate for takings of air easements, navigable
airspace or not. 98 The Court in Griggs noted that “the use of land
presupposes the use of some of the airspace above it.” 99 In short, Causby
and Griggs hold that navigable airspace designations must yield to
property rights at low altitudes.
Therefore, the common practice evolved for airports to negotiate and
compensate landowners for nuisance and avigation easements. 100 Today,
airports prefer to acquire all the land (including the airspace) needed for
landing and departing aircraft, but, as FAA guidance notes, land
acquisition is not always possible. 101 In those cases, the FAA requires
airports receiving federal support to purchase an avigation easement from
neighboring property owners. 102 As discussed later in this paper, courts
presume that the two zones of airspace are separated at 500 feet above
ground level, though property interests can extend higher.
IV. APPLICATION TO DRONE AIRSPACE REGULATION AND LIABILITY
As part of the 2018 FAA Reauthorization Act, Congress and the
president required the FAA to integrate small drones into the national
airspace system. 103 An extensive commercial drone industry will need
drone highways—aerial corridors—crisscrossing towns, suburbs, and
cities. Currently, some small drone corridor pilot programs exist around
the country. However, if the FAA were to extend those drone corridors
unilaterally, the corridors would face opposition not only from

97. Griggs v. Allegheny Cty., 369 U.S. 84, 88–89 (1962).
98. Id. at 88.
99. Id. at 89.
100. See, e.g., Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, Appendix F: Noise and Avigation
Easements (F.A.R. Report, Noise Compatibility Study Update, 1999), https://www.skyharbor.com/
docs/default-source/pdfs/Part-150/appendices/1999_part150_appendixf_
noiseandavigationeasements.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (several examples of the legal templates for easement s
negotiated between airports and nearby property owners) [https://perma.cc/WB2H-84XQ].
101. F ED.AVIATION ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY C IRCULAR NO. 150/5100-17,
LAND ACQUISITION AND R ELOCATION ASSISTANCE FOR AIRPORT IMPROVEMENT P ROGRAM (AIP)
ASSISTED P ROJECTS at 1–7 (2005), https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/advisory_circular/
150-5100-17/150_5100_17_chg6.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA8P-PRGP].
102. Id. at 1–7. (“Normally the [airport] sponsor will acquire fee title to all land within the airport
boundaries and for the runway protection zone (RPZ). If fee acquisition for the RPZ is not practical
then an avigation easement is required.”)
103. 49 U.S.C. § 44802 (2020).
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landowners but also from state governments, who have a plausible claim
of sovereignty and police powers over surface airspace. 104
The Court in Causby and Griggs illustrated three legal principles that
are relevant for drone operations:
a. Landowners own surface airspace—the immediate reaches
above the land—including the airspace unoccupied by
buildings.
b. Low-altitude flights in surface airspace, even if within
navigable airspace, can amount to a taking.
c. The Court will look to state claims of sovereignty to airspace
and state law for the definition of airspace property.
Federal and state policymakers should consider formalizing a framework
of cooperative federalism to quickly integrate drones into U.S. airspace
while avoiding controversy and litigation between the federal and state
governments. 105 This idea for cooperative federalism for drone regulation
has been described elsewhere, 106 given the legal and practical realities of
drone operations (for example, only three FAA employees enforce drone
regulations in Ohio, a state of nearly 12 million residents). 107 In this
framework, the FAA would largely be responsible for certifying drone
aircraft and UTM systems (for example, separation minimums between
drones and emergency landing procedures) and “whitelisting” surface
airspace where drone operations could commence. States and cities would
then have responsibility for demarcating drone highways, leasing airspace
if needed, and creating other traditional time, place, and manner
restrictions.
Perhaps the closest cooperative federalism model and analog is
telecommunications—another technology with widespread enterprise and
consumer use. The construction and operation of droneports and drone
highways, like telecommunications, will require local zoning permits and
private property. In telecommunications, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) has sole authority over communications devices and
104. THE F EDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison) (“The powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.”).
105. Michael S. Greve, Bloc Party Federalism, 42 HARV. J. L. & P UB. P OL’Y 279, 287 (2019)
(noting that cooperative federalism “works where and when states are tolerably homogenous” and
“breaks down when a substantial number of states, acting as a bloc, refuse cooperation”) (emphasis
in original).
106. Jonathan M. Zalewski, Sharing the Sky: Regulating Unmanned Aircraft in American
Airspace Via Cooperative Federalism, 42 U. DAYTON L. R EV. 333 (2017).
107. Id. at 351.
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interstate communications. However, the FCC does not choose where to
install telecommunications facilities. Instead, state and local police
powers govern the construction of cell sites and conduit, though Congress
authorizes the FCC to preempt state or local rules that “may prohibit or
have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any
interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.” 108 Another similarity
drones have with telecommunications is the possible use of public rightsof-way, a proposal discussed later in this paper. That proposal for airspace
leasing of the public rights-of-way to drone operators contemplates
revenue sharing between federal and state governments, another element
where federal and state interests coincide.
Above all, by demarcating low-altitude drone corridors above public
rights-of-way, federal and state aviation officials and drone operators can
avoid takings and other lawsuits from residents and property owners.
Landowners suffer not only nuisance and trespass from regular drone
flights, but also the potential loss of their air rights. 109 Likewise, local
droneport system operators, whether public or private, face the prospect
of expensive litigation and landowner remedies if they fly into surface
airspace above private property. 110 Private droneport and UTM system
108. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a).
109. With drone overflights, landowners face not only nuisance and trespass but also, over years,
drone operators’ possible acquisition of a prescriptive easement to landowners’ airspace, which would
entitle drone operators to enter property to cut trees or prevent new construction on the land. Several
states that have considered aviation lawsuits have recognized prescriptive easements—essentiall y
adverse possession of airspace. Courts in California, Connecticut, Oregon, and Washington recognize
prescriptive easements of airspace. Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 270 Cal.
Rptr. 337, (Ct. App. 1990); Insitoris v. City of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 418, (Ct. App. 1989);
Ventres v. Godspeed Airport LLC, 881 A.2d 937, 949 (Conn. 2005) (holding that airports can acquire
prescriptive easement, including the right to enter neighboring land and cut trees); Christie v. Miller,
719 P.2d 68, 70 (Or. Ct. App. 1986); Petersen v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67, 70 (Wash. 1980)
(acknowledging that avigation easements for public use can be prescriptively acquired and are not
compensable). Although not expressly acknowledging a prescriptive easement, a New York court
similarly prevented development in an aviation case. 3775 Genesee St., Inc. v. State, 415 N.Y.S.2d
575, 585 (1979) (“Although the operations of the airport have expanded considerably since 1962, the
claimant purchased the property with knowledge of the presence of an airport, and therefore assumed
the risk of fluctuations in market value that might be caused by the existence of a nearby airport. In
this case, it cannot be said that the claimant ever had a reasonable expectation that the building could
be vertically expanded. As the operations of the airport increased, the possibility of expansion
diminished. This was not a result of the taking but of the risk the property owner assumed upon
purchase of the property.”).
110. It is established law that noise and takings issues fall on the airport—the FAA has generally
been absolved of responsibility. “It is now firmly established that the airport proprietor is responsible
for the consequences which attend his operation of a public airport.” Air Transp. Ass’n v. Crotti, 389
F. Supp. 58, 63 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (citing City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624,
635 n.14 (1973)); see Ricarda L. Bennett, Airport Noise Litigation: Case Law Review, 47 J. AIR L. &
C OM. 449, 489 (1982). Much more than federal courts, which tend to limit inverse condemnation to
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operators are particularly vulnerable, much like private airports face more
costly lawsuits than public airports. 111
Unlike airport operators, droneport operators face potential lawsuits
from virtually any resident subject to overflights because most drones are
near the surface during the entire flight, not simply on takeoff and landing.
As the Meredith case and more than a dozen drone shootings reveal, many
Americans have great skepticism about drone flights. 112
V. PROPOSAL

FOR AIRSPACE

LEASING ABOVE FEDERAL AND STATE
ROADWAYS

The FAA has acknowledged local authorities’ “police power” in five
areas: land use, zoning, privacy, trespass, and law enforcement
operations. 113 The jurisdictional problem arises because airspace is land—
subject to state police powers—and navigable airspace—subject to
federal regulation. As mentioned earlier, many states have claimed
sovereignty over low-altitude airspace, and more than 20 states expressly
allow state and municipal officials to lease airspace above public land or
public easements. 114
A.

Cooperative Federalism for Airspace Leasing

To avoid lawsuits from private property owners for takings and
trespass and to avoid federal preemption litigation, the USDOT and state
DOTs should expand their existing airspace leasing collaboration and
revenue sharing to establish drone highways. USDOT and state DOTs
overhead flights, state courts interpret state constitutions’ conception of inverse condemnation to
include aircraft noise over adjacent properties. Bennett, supra at 490; see also, e.g., Greater
Westchester Homeowners Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles, 603 P.2d 1329 (Cal. 1979). In some states,
if a landowner wins an inverse condemnation lawsuit against the state, the state is responsible for
reasonable fees, including attorney’s fees. See, e.g., C AL. C IV. P ROC. C ODE § 1036; VA. C ODE ANN.
§ 25.1-420.
111. No court, for instance, has enjoined a publicly operated airport (though damages for
nuisance have been awarded). In contrast, privately owned airports face court injunctions. J. Scott
Hamilton, Allocation of Airspace as a Scarce Natural Resource, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 251, 262 (1994).
Court penalties also seem to be stiffer, including daily damages for continuing operations. Id.
112. Brent Skorup & Connor Haaland, Encounters of the Drone Kind: Drone Shootings and NoFly Zones, TECH. LIBERATION F RONT (June 26, 2020) (documenting cases of drone shootings in the
United
States),
https://techliberation.com/2020/06/26/encounters-of-the-drone-kind-dro n eshootings-and-no-fly-zones/ [https://perma.cc/J5VR-5V3G].
113. Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 42,063,
42,194 (June 28, 2016) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 21, 43, 61, 91, 101, 107, et al.).
114. See B RENT S KORUP & C ONNOR HAALAND, WHICH S TATES ARE P REPARED FOR THE DRONE
INDUSTRY? A 50-S TATE R EPORT C ARD (2020), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/technologyand-innovation/which-states-are-prepared-d rone-industry [https://perma.cc/RK84-MWUV].
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would share responsibility for demarcating aerial corridors given the mix
of aviation safety, state police powers, and property rights issues. States
would generally receive leasing revenues from airspace use over state
highways and local roads, and the U.S. Department of Transportation
would receive leasing revenues from airspace use over interstate
highways.
Airspace leasing is not new. There was, for instance, a short period
of market disposition—open bidding—on air routes in the 1920s until
Congress and federal regulators stepped in suddenly to assign airspace,
routes, and terminals via administrative processes. 115 More relevantly for
small drones, a 1961 amendment to federal highway laws formalized the
practice of airspace leasing, allowing states and cities “to use or permit
the use of the airspace above and below . . . the highway pavement for
such purposes as will not impair the full use and safety of the highway.”116
In the 1970s and 1980s, state DOTs began leasing airspace in earnest as
many states’ financial status degraded. 117
Beginning in 1986, the Federal Highway Administration of the U.S.
Department of Transportation created a policy that state departments of
transportation must dedicate revenue from roadway airspace leasing to
highway programs, not general revenue funds. 118 Having put this policy
into place, the Federal Highway Administration began encouraging
airspace leasing and offered technical assistance to state DOTs to
routinize the practice. 119 To date, no states have employed drone highways
under this authority.
B.

Drone Highways Above Roadways

The idea for leasing airspace above highways or utility and railroad
rights-of-way to drone operators has circulated for a few years. 120 In fall
115. See Brent Skorup, Who Should Govern the Skies?, in EYES TO THE S KY (Matthew Feeney
ed., 2021); Gareth R. Jones & Michael W. Pustay, Interorganizational Coordination in the Airline
Industry, 1925–1938: A Transaction Cost Approach, 14 J. MGMT. 529, 537 (1988).
116. Federal-Aid Highway Program of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-61, § 104, 75 Stat. 122 (1961)
(codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 111(a)).
117. Roop & Mathur, supra note 72, at 2.
118. See id.
119. Id.
120. In Japan, for instance, the regulator envisions drone highways that use the airspace owned
by public utilities. See TEPCO Group, Zenrin and Rakuten Examining “Drone Highways”
for Drone Logistics, AJOT: AIR C ARGO NEWS (July 16, 2018), https://www.ajot.com/news/tepcogroup-zenrin-and-rakuten-examining-drone-highways-for-d rone-logistics [https://perma.cc/KNC6795B]; Success in Package Delivery Experiment Using Drone Highway through Mountains, TEPCO
VENTURES, INC. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.tepcoventures.co.jp/en_news/success-in-packagedelivery-experiment-using-drone-highway-through-mountains-tepco -ventures-rakuten-zenrin -and-
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2017, the FAA’s Drone Advisory Committee invited me to brief a
working group about drone airspace leasing. The Drone Advisory
Committee discussed the idea in their 2018 report to the FAA; and the
GAO discussed the idea again in 2019 and 2020 reports. 121 The earliest
publication of the idea, to my knowledge, is a June 2017 Salt Lake Tribune
story, noting that a Utah lawmaker proposed airspace leasing above public
roads. 122 The idea may have developed from railroad or utility use of
drones. BNSF Railway, for instance, flew hundreds of hours of longdistance drone flights from 2014 to 2018 under the FAA’s Pathfinder
Program using the railroad’s airspace within the railroad right-of-way,123
and the market in airspace use above railroad rights-of-way has been
active for over a century. 124
There are several benefits to federal and state authorities demarcating
safe drone routes above roadways. First, using public right-of-way
chichibu-city-jointly-conducted-beyond-visual-line-of-sight-drone-flighttest/[https://perma.cc/BWN3-LKR4]. In the interest of brevity, this paper does not analyze the issue
of leasing utility or railroad rights-of-way airspace. Such leases would likely resemble the private sale
and leasing of airspace.
121. Drone Advisory Comm., Fed. Aviation Admin., Drone Integration Funding 21 22 (Radio
Tech. Comm’n for Aeuronatics, RTCA Paper No.047-18/DAC 011, Mar. 2018),
https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/drone_advisory_committee/rtca_dac/media/dac_tg
3_funding_report_long_term_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3HH-64RL] (discussing the “Auction or
Lease of Airspace”); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-20-136, AIRCRAFT S YSTEMS: FAA
S HOULD IMPROVE DRONE-R ELATED C OST INFORMATION AND C ONSIDER OPTIONS TO R ECOVER
C OSTS (2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/703320.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RCA-HP6V]; U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., B-330570 UNMANNED AIRCRAFT S YSTEMS: C URRENT
JURISDICTIONAL, P ROPERTY, AND P RIVACY LEGAL ISSUES R EGARDING THE C OMMERCIAL AND
R ECREATIONAL USE OF DRONES, APPENDICES I–VI 35 (2020), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/710/709371.pdf [https://perma.cc/WGX9-AYZ5] (“[T]wo legal commentators have recentl y
proposed that states could create ‘drone highways’ above public rights-of-way that UAS operators
could use for parcel delivery and other services”); see also Brent Skorup, Auctioning Airspace, 21
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 79 (2019) (proposing the demarcation and auction of aerial corridors for passenger
drones).
122. Lee Davidson, Request for Transportation and Transit Reform Ideas Bring Flood of
Proposals—Including State Takeover of UTA, S ALT LAKE TRIBUNE (June 14, 2017),
https://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=5403664&itype=CMSID [https://perma.cc/PW78-WWAS]
(citing Sophia DiCaro); see also Brent Skorup & Melody Calkins, Why Not Auction Off Low-Altitude
Airspace for
Exclusive
Use?,
TECH. LIBERATION F RONT (June 27,
2017),
https://techliberation.com/2017/06/27/why-not-auction-off-low-altitude-airspace-for-exclusive-use/[
https://perma.cc/AXV9-226Q].
123. “BNSF’s work with the FAA demonstrated our ability to control the land and airspace
utilized by our UAS flights across managed flight corridors over BNSF’s property.” Keeping Pace
with Innovation–Update on the Safe Integration of UAS into the Airspace: Before the U.S. S. Comm.
on Com., Sci. and Transp.’s Aviation Operations, Safety and Sec. Subcomm., 115th Cong. 2 (2018)
(statement of Todd Graetz, Director of Technology Services: BNSF Railway Company),
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/6B09FEF7-53C8-4AFD-9066-0FA19C430BA1.
124. Committee on New Developments in Real Estate Practice, Recent Developments in
Airspace Utilization, 5 R EAL P ROP. P ROB. & TR. J. 347, 350–52 (1970).
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airspace negates most trespass, takings, and nuisance lawsuits from
landowners because the airspace is already acquired and dedicated for
(somewhat noisy) transportation uses. Second, demarcating airspace for
drone highways opens up vast potential for new competitors and services.
Drone operators can deploy services quickly once they obtain access to
airspace. In April 2020, the United Parcel Service and drone operator
DroneUp revealed how quickly they could deploy services once they have
airspace access: 125
‘DroneUp and UPS did the most extensive delivery of packages that has
ever been done,’ says Tom Walker, DroneUp CEO. ‘Hundreds, if not
thousands of flights—it was an exhaustive exercise. We took a [vacant]
55-acre college campus, we made it a town, and by the end of day two
we were doing deliveries every 3 minutes.’

Roadways and their accompanying airspace represent a huge amount
of unused, non-revenue-generating public real estate. “Most major cities’
road systems take up 25%–35% of the city’s land area,” 126 and, according
to estimates using Federal Highway Administration data, “the amount of
existing [right-of-way] that is a part of the National Highway System
(NHS) is between 3,000–6,000 square miles,” which is about the size of
Connecticut. 127 Since there are “more than 8 million lane miles of public
roadways under state DOT supervision,” 128 there is an extensive
nationwide air corridor network for drone operators to use.
Third, roadway airspace leasing ensures that the market allocates this
natural resource, not via regulatory rationing or first-come-first-serve
mechanisms. 129 Markets dispose of public assets such as offshore oil
leases and public timberlands, 130 and there is legal precedent for airspace
leasing. Under federal law, state DOTs must charge fair market value for
airspace leases—no giveaways—of aerial real estate above roadways

125. Miriam McNabb, UPS Drone Delivery: DroneUp Flies to Prove the Case for Coronavirus
Response, DRONELIFE (Apr. 21, 2020), https://dronelife.com/2020/04/21/ups-drone-deliverydroneup-partners-fly-to-prove-the-case-for-coron avirus-response/[https://perma.cc/8KWX-BT47].
126. In suburban areas “the percentage is smaller, around 15%–20%.” Leo Thompson, Is Your
City Infrastructurally Obese?, S TRONG TOWNS, (Oct. 29, 2019), https://www.strongtowns.org/
journal/2019/10/29/is-your-city-infrastructurally-obese?rq=leo[https://perma.cc/9D2H-HS2D].
127. U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., F UTURE USES OF HIGHWAY R IGHTS OF WAY (2012),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/otps/rowstudyproj.cfm [https://perma.cc/762K-HMPR].
128. Carson Poe & Gina Filosa, Alternative Uses of Highway Rights-of-Way: Accommodating
Renewable Energy Technologies, 2270 TRANSP. R SCH. R EC. 23 (2012).
128. See Skorup, supra note 115.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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purchased with assistance from the federal Highway Trust Fund. 131 It’s
difficult to define ex-ante the best terms of a lease that encourages longterm investments into drone infrastructure while not creating local or
regional monopolies. However, a good analog is spectrum licenses—10year licenses with the presumption of renewal—which encourage billions
of dollars of annual infrastructure investment. A “layer cake” approach to
leasing will promote competition in drone services (perhaps three drone
highways above each roadway at three separate altitudes) and encourage
secondary markets in airspace leases.
A final related benefit is that the government receives newfound
revenue for the disposition of drone corridors. Under current law, the
federal government retains a pro-rata share of airspace leasing revenues
for road projects receiving federal funding. 132 Thus, one needs federal
approval for airspace leasing above those roads, but states have and should
have a relatively free hand in leasing airspace above state and local roads
to drone operators. 133
Airspace leasing above the public rights-of-way isn’t straightforward
in every state. In some jurisdictions, there is extensive practice with
airspace leasing, while in others, it is difficult under current state law. The
nature of the title or right the state or municipality (or utility or railroad)
holds to surface airspace above a road or tracks depends on the
jurisdiction. 134 Illinois law is quite restrictive, for example, and
municipalities can lease airspace to only the owners of the fee. 135 Virginia
131. Under federal law, “a State shall charge, at a minimum, fair market value for the sale, use,
lease, or lease renewal . . . of real property acquired with Federal assistance made available from the
Highway Trust Fund.” 23 U.S.C. § 156(a). This applies to right-of-way airspace: “The predecessor to
§ 156 of title 23, U.S.C., applied only to the sale, use, lease or lease renewals of ‘right-of-way
airspace’. . . . [The Federal Highway Administration] correctly interprets the TEA-21 amendment as
expanding the scope of § 156 to allow reapplication of the proceeds from all real property
dispositions.” Letter from Anthony H. Gamboa, General Counsel, to Sen. John McCain, Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation (Sept. 13, 2002) (on file with the U.S. Gov’t. Acct. Off.)
https://www.gao.gov/assets/370/366636.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZW4B-QCWR].
132. Gamboa, supra note 131, at 6 (“[I]n 1987, Congress asserted an interest in the federal share
of the proceeds resulting from the disposition of air rights.”).
133. U.S. DEP’T. OF TRANSP., AIRSPACE GUIDELINES TO 23 CFR 710.405–710.407 (2010),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/real_estate/right-of-way/corridor_management/airspace_guidelines.cfm
[https://perma.cc/3C4L-TQRV] (“FHWA approval [for air rights leases above roads] is normally
required only for airspace leases on the Interstate system.”). Right-of-way use agreements for airspace
above interstate roads must meet federal requirements. See 23 C.F.R. § 710.405 (2016).
134. See, e.g., Kiely v. Graves, 271 P.3d 226, 230 (Wash. 2012) (internal citations omitted)
(“The title or right acquired by the public in a statutory dedication depends upon the language of a
jurisdiction’s dedication statute. In many jurisdictions, a statutory dedication conveys a fee interest to
the public. However, in other jurisdictions a statutory dedication may confer no further right than a
mere easement.).
135. 65 ILL. C OMP. S TAT. § 5/11-75-1.
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law is more liberal and allows municipalities to lease or sell airspace
above roads and rights-of-way that the municipality owns in fee simple. 136
However, Oregon has perhaps the broadest airspace leasing law, allowing
leasing of airspace whether the state or municipality possesses fee title or
an easement. 137 Some states, like California, have well-established
airspace leasing offices, 138 whereas others have little experience in
airspace leasing.
One objection—safety of pedestrians and road users—is imminent
and worth responding to briefly. Drones flying overhead will crowd urban
skies somewhat, and collisions with other drones or foreign objects (such
as birds, wires, and construction cranes) are possible. To date, the FAA
ensures safety with drone certifications and inspections of operations,
which will mitigate much of the risk. Nevertheless, the flight over
roadways injects some risk to pedestrians and roadways users. As with
any new service or product, some combination of government
certification, professionalization of operators, and new insurance products
will mitigate risk. Some insurers are already creating new or expanding
traditional aviation products to cover drones and drone debris. 139 The risk
of over-roadway drone operations is not negligible, but a professionally
operated drone abiding by FAA policies likely poses less risk to life and
property than other routine roadway uses.
VI. PROPOSAL

FOR A PRESUMPTION OF TRESPASS FOR
BELOW 200 FEET

DRONE FLIGHTS

The final issue is determining the height at which drone operators
can fly with some certitude that they will not face liability from private
landowners. As other legal commentators have noted, the ambiguity
surrounding drone trespass invites complex litigation between drone
operators and landowners. 140 Traditional aviation law and judicial
136. VA. C ODE ANN. § 15.2-2030 (2011).
137. The law provides: Any political subdivision holding the easement or fee title to a street or
highway may lease the space above or below that street or highway for private purposes . . . .” OR.
R EV. S TAT. § 271.430.
138. Airspace and Telecommunications Licensing, C AL. DEPT. OF TRANSP., https://dot.ca.gov/
programs/right-of-way/airspace-and-telecommunications-licensing [https://perma.cc/2FJX-4U4H].
139. See, e.g., Handing Over Control to Autonomous Vehicles, INS. C AN. (Apr. 25, 2014),
https://www.insurance-canada.ca/2014/04/25/handing-over-control-to-autonomous-vehicles/
[https://perma.cc/2YES-XN55] (“Lloyd’s underwriters, including Kiln, are already insuring UAS,
and are lending their expertise to regulatory discussions in the European Union aimed at gradually
accommodating the new technology . . . .”).
140. See, e.g., Lindsey P. Gustafson, Arkansas Airspace Ownership and the Challenge of
Drones, 39 U. ARK. LITTLE R OCK L. R EV. 245, 255 (2017); Lane Page, Note, Drone Trespass and
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precedents provide a possible model. As Migala points out, courts apply
a limit of 500 feet almost mechanically, finding a compensable taking for
even transitory flights below 500 feet. 141 This 500-foot rule is treated
much like a presumption by courts: 142 the floor for a taking, not the
ceiling. As one federal court stated in an aerial takings case: “[T]he most
appropriate rule is that when overflights occur in navigable airspace [that
is, above 500 feet altitude], a presumption of non-taking exists[,] which
can be overcome by proof of destruction of, or substantial impairment to
the property.” 143 This judge-made rule likely derived from FAA
regulations, which, with some exceptions for glide paths and
helicopters, 144 deem airspace below 500 feet as non-navigable airspace. 145
This rule derives from the Supreme Court’s holdings in Causby and
Griggs that landowners “must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.” 146 That 500-foot rule provides
useful certainty in traditional aviation about liability and property rights.
And some proposals recommend drawing an invisible, fixed line in the
sky to separate private property from navigable airspace and drone
routes. 147 Some scholars would draw the line at 200 feet, 148 some at 350
feet, 149 and some at 500 feet (resembling traditional aviation’s legal
standards). 150 There is a bill in the U.S. House and another in the U.S.

the Line Separating the National Airspace and Private Property, 86 GEO. WASH. L. R EV. 1152, 1173
(2018).
141. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny Cnty., 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962); Palisades Citizens Ass’n., v.
C.A.B., 420 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. 15,909 Acres, 176 F. Supp. 447, 448
(S.D. Cal. 1958); Speir v. United States, 485 F.2d 643, 646–47 (Ct. Cl. 1973); Aaron v. United States,
311 F.2d 798, 801 (Ct. Cl. 1963); A.J. Hodges Indus. v. United States, 355 F.2d 592, 597 (Ct. Cl.
1966); Jensen v. United States, 305 F.2d 444, 446 (Ct. Cl. 1962); Dick v. United States, 169 F. Supp.
491, 494 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Highland Park, Inc. v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 597, 598 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
Persyn v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 187, 195–96 (1995), aff’d, 106 F.3d 424 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Hsu v.
Cty. of Clark, 173 P.3d 724, 731–32 (Nev. 2007); Thompson v. City of Denver, 958 P.2d 525, 527
(Colo. App. 1998); Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
142. See, e.g., Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88, 102–03 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
143. Stephens v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 352, 362 (1986).
144. See 14 CFR § 91.119(d) (2010) (permitting helicopter and powered parachute operations
below the usual minimum safe altitude requirements).
145. See 14 CFR § 91.119 (2010).
146. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
147. Gustafson, supra note 140, at 264–66.
148. Page, supra note 140, at 1173.
149. Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for Legislatures,
B ROOKINGS (Nov. 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/research/drones-and-aerial-surveillan ce considerations-for-legislatures/ [https://perma.cc/7Q5U-4CJL].
150. See Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. R EV. 155 (2015).
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Senate that would draw that line, largely delegating airspace management
below 200 feet to the states and private property owners. 151
However, in the absence of congressional or FAA action on this
issue, courts should establish a presumption of trespass for drone flights
below a certain altitude. The 200-foot line used in those proposed bills is
a useful benchmark for courts.
The starting point is Causby, which holds that “invasions of
[superadjacent airspace] are in the same category as invasions of the
surface.” 152 Clearly, the FAA cannot simply start designating drone
corridors below the rooflines and treetops in backyards and private lands,
absent compensation to the landowner. However, Causby and subsequent
cases inject a nuisance standard into takings jurisprudence: 153 an aerial
invasion is a taking, the Causby Court says, when it creates “a direct and
immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land.” 154
Courts should presume flights below 200 feet as a trespass and a
nuisance. Above that height, most small drones are fairly quiet. More
evidence is needed, but pilot programs in the United States suggest that
drones flying above 200 feet altitude would not substantially interfere
with the use and enjoyment of the underlying land. 155
Further, below 200 feet, the safety concerns of manned aircraft and
the FAA attenuate. Most airspace below 500 feet is non-navigable
airspace, so very few manned aircraft fly in surface airspace. The FAA’s
light-handed approach to aerial obstructions below 200 feet indicates that
the federal interest attenuates. In particular, current regulations require
developers and construction companies to notify the FAA of new
151. Drone Innovation Act of 2017, H.R. 2930, 115th Cong. (2017).
152. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946).
153. Compare with a legal definition of a private nuisance: “when the plaintiff’s use and
enjoyment of her land is interfered with substantially and unreasonably through a thing or activity.”
Legal Information Institute, WEX LAW DICTIONARY, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nuisance
[https://perma.cc/5K4B-54AG]. This blending of nuisance and trespass in aerial invasion cases has
old precedents. See e.g., Clifton v. Bury [1887] 4 TLR 8 (U.K.) (finding that shots fired across land
at a trajectory of 75 feet did not constitute a technical trespass but was nevertheless actionable when
dangerous to the use and enjoyment of the land).
154. Causby, 328 U.S. at 266 (1946).
155. Google Wing flights in Virginia cruise between 100 feet and 200 feet above the ground. See
Shayne Dwyer, Christiansburg Meets Wing, the Self-Flying Delivery Drones Soon to Be in Its Sky,
10 NEWS (Sept. 28, 2019), https://www.wsls.com/2019/09/28/christiansburg-meets-wing-the-selfflying-delivery-drones-soon-to-be-in-its-sky/
[https://perma.cc/NUZ8-8PS7]; Jacob Demmitt,
Droning On: Some Warn of Rift to Come When Aerial Delivery Arrives in Blacksburg and
Christiansburg, R OANOKE NEWS (May 25, 2019), https://roanoke.com/news/droning-on-some-warnof-rift-to-come-when-aerial-delivery-arrives-in -blacksburg -and/article_63c29d ec-5c70-551 c-bdc2a549e4b3f8c9.html [https://perma.cc/33YR-XLRE] (“The mayors of the towns where Google Wing
flights are operating have not heard major resident complaints about drone noise.”).
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construction or towers within approximately 3.5 miles of an airport. 156
This notice is not required, however, for towers and obstructions that are
less than 200 feet tall, 157 presumably because such obstructions pose a
negligible risk to air traffic. 158 A presumption of trespass at 200 feet would
recognize two realities: property rights and police powers are stronger at
the surface, and federal interests and aviation safety more salient above
200 feet.
VII. CONCLUSION
Drone technology has rapidly matured in recent years. Today, firms
and state governments are prepared to deploy statewide UTM systems and
extensive long-distance drone services. Until federal and state aviation
officials define their respective regulatory responsibilities, however,
litigation and fear of stranded investigation will delay the industry. Under
current understandings of property and takings law, historical federal
dominance in aviation is not feasible in a world of drones flying in lowaltitude surface airspace. Federal and state policymakers should anticipate
the gridlock and legal controversies and recognize state, city, and
landowner interests in airspace. Further, through demarcation and leasing
of airspace above roadways, the industry and public authorities can almost
immediately begin widespread, long-distance drone services.

156. 14 C.F.R. § 77.17(a) (2011); 14 CFR § 77.9 (2011).
157. Id.
158. That said, section 2110 of the FAA Extension, Safety and Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. No.
114-190, 199, 130 Stat. 615, 623–25 (2016), requires improved physical markings or lighting for
some rural towers that are 50–200 feet tall. New FAA Rules Will Require Some 50-to-200-Foot
Towers to Be Marked, WIRELESS ESTIMATOR (July 25, 2016), http://wirelessestimator.com/
articles/2016/new-faa-rules-will-require-some-50-to-200-foot-towers-to-be-marked/
[https://perma.cc/2DFL-BHRC].
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